Abstract: 

Counterfeit microelectronics remain a persistent challenge in defense and high-reliability systems, not due to a lack of detection capability, but because their true cost is systematically underestimated. While procurement values are often modest, downstream impacts—including investigation, testing, legal action, and program-level remediation— can escalate nonlinearly once system integrity is questioned. This presentation examines the cost mechanics of counterfeit exposure and identifies the primary drivers of cost escalation beyond initial part value.

Using a structured cost-analysis framework and a Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) case study, the work demonstrates how approximately $1.8 million in procurement can generate $10–20 million in total lifecycle costs due to uncertainty-driven investigation and system- wide remediation. The analysis highlights that cost is driven less by defect detection itself and more by the interpretation of results and the resulting expansion of investigation scope.

Findings from recent inter-laboratory evaluations further show that while laboratories consistently identify observable defects, significant variability remains in how those findings are interpreted and translated into counterfeit classifications. This variability contributes directly to false positives and false negatives, which in turn trigger unnecessary redesign actions or allow risk to propagate downstream—both of which significantly increase total cost.

The presentation argues that current mitigation approaches, which emphasize testing and documentation, are insufficient to control cost without stronger integration of traceability and decision support. A traceability-centered decision framework—linking provenance, physical evidence, and test results—enables earlier detection, bounds investigation scope, and supports more consistent and defensible outcomes.

These results suggest a shift in focus from detection alone to decision consistency and uncertainty reduction, positioning traceability not as a compliance requirement, but as a critical cost-avoidance and risk-reduction mechanism for complex electronic systems.

Biography: 

Paula George is a recognized leader in counterfeit materiel prevention, quality assurance, and standards development, with more than 38 years of service supporting the U.S. Department of Defense and the aerospace and defense industrial base.
She began her engineering career following graduation from Oakland University (Rochester MI) with a B.S. in Engineering (Mechanical and Materials concentration), working for the Ford Motor Company (manual transaxles) and later Goodyear Aerospace, where she conducted research and development on carbon-carbon friction materials for aircraft braking systems.
In 1987, Paula joined the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), beginning a distinguished federal career that included engineering support for government contract management, quality assurance, Non-Destructive Testing (NDT), and the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP). She later served at both DLA and Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Headquarters, where she became DCMA's Program Manager and Lead Course Developer for NDT.
Widely regarded as one of the government's foremost advocates for counterfeit materiel prevention, Paula played a pivotal role in establishing and advancing many of today's leading SAE counterfeit avoidance standards. She was instrumental in the formation of the SAE G-21 Committee and is a principal contributor to SAE AS6174, the foundational standard for assuring the acquisition of authentic and conforming materiel. She also established and chaired the G-21R Committee, leading the development of SAE AS6886 for preventing counterfeit refrigerant.
Paula has served as a long-time leader within SAE's counterfeit prevention community, contributing to numerous standards including AS6171, AS5553, AS6081, AS6496, AS6832, AS6834, ARP6328, ARP6178, and AIR6273. She served as Co-Chair of the SAE G-19A subcommittee that developed AS6171/5, (the radiography/radioscopy test method standard), and currently serves as a Co-Chair of both the SAE G-19 and G-21 Committees.
Her career has been dedicated to strengthening trust by working with other federal entities and commercial/academic organizations, reporting counterfeits and other supply issues to GIDEP, and increasing supply chain resilience throughout critical defense and industry supply chains. Following Paula’s retirement from federal service in 2025, she has remained actively engaged in standards development, supply chain assurance initiatives, and emerging cyber- physical security activities through SAE's G-32 Committee.

Dr. Diganta Das

For more information or questions regarding the technical program (including Professional Development Courses), contact the Conference Chair, Dr. Diganta Das

Kristin Nafstad

For more information or questions regarding event logistics, exhibitions, and sponsorship, contact Kristin Nafstad.