Abstract: 

Over the past several years, SMT’s labs have observed and carefully studied the common links and unique identifying characteristics between Chinese-manufactured clones of both Micro-Controllers and Serial Configuration Devices. Clones for both device types were painstakingly designed to generate the same proprietary command/operation codes and identification codes (handshake IDs) as the targeted OCM device designs for whom they were emulating.  The correct “electronic recognition handshake” is a critical safeguard gateway step necessary for interface to upstream wired & wireless networks in the case of Micro Controllers as well as the initial “power-on” program uploads to FPGAs in the case of Serial Configuration Devices. 
     To give the audience a clear sense of the development speed of the constantly-evolving counterfeit threat this presentation will begin by covering a condensed, photo-documented history of the post-Y2K emerging counterfeit-chip processes encountered & mitigated by SMT labs prior to the initial identification of fully-functional clones in 2012. The main presentation will focus on the much more concerning post-2012 evolving clone threat we are seeing today including detailed component forensic imagery; comparative known-good vs. clone electrical test data; potential finished-goods vulnerabilities and future exploit capabilities. The presentation will conclude with the status of the “Made in China 2025” initiative and its potential future impact on the global electronics market of the future.

 

Biography:

Tom Sharpe [SMT Corporation]

Tom is the previous owner and now consultant to SMT Corp, a stocking distributor of obsolete and DMS- type electronic components within the Defense & Aerospace Industry. SMT also maintains the largest in-house authentication and electrical testing service capability within the Independent Distribution sector. Tom is a 2009 founding member of the SAE G-19 AS6081 committee and his company was a significant data contributor to the AS6171 counterfeit detection test standard. Between 2009-2012 SMT’s labs were credited with the initial identification and industry sharing of many newly evolved counterfeit processes as well as developing required mitigation inspection techniques to reliably detect these previously unseen counterfeiting methods. In 2011 the US Senate Armed Services Committee formally requested SMT to provide subject-matter-expert testimony before their formal investigation hearings into Counterfeit Electronic Components within DOD Supply Chains. In 2012 SMT labs were the first to identify a new and much more concerning threat from China in the form of functional cloned electronic devices across multiple device families and manufacturers.
Over the past 10 years, SMT labs have focused on identifying marks, material compositions, and unique functional characteristics of these carefully cloned devices that now threaten the most active western Chip-Maker (OCM) component families. SMT Corp presentations serve to educate all sectors of the electronics industry about the growing cyber and reliability dangers of these highly advanced counterfeit devices now threatening global supply chains within the entire electronics industry.